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Higher-order risk effects play an important role in examining economic behavior under 
uncertainty. A precautionary demand for saving has been linked to the property of prudence 
and the property of temperance has been used to show how the presence of an unavoidable 
risk affects one’s behavior towards a second risk. These two properties also play key roles in 
aversion to negative skewness and to kurtosis, respectively. Both properties recently have 
been characterized by preferences over lottery pairs in simple 50-50 gambles. The simplicity 
of this characterization is ideal for experimental investigation. This paper reports the results of 
such experiments and concludes that there is behavioral evidence for prudence, but not for 
temperance. Implications of these results for both expected-utility and non-expected-utility 
models are examined. 
JEL Code: C9, D8. 
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Ever since Daniel Bernoulli (1738), risk aversion has played a key role in examining decision 
making under uncertainty.  Although modeled in many different ways over the years, the basic 
premise has been the same: a risk-averse individual would prefer a payoff with certainty over a 
risky payoff with the same mean.
1   
Though much younger than the notion of risk aversion, the concept of prudence has been used in 
assessing a precautionary demand for saving for more than 40 years.  Although the term 
“prudence” was not introduced until Kimball (1990), its relationship to saving behavior was 
noted much earlier by Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970).  In particular, these authors used an 
expected-utility setting to show how a risky future labor income did not guarantee that a 
consumer would decrease current consumption (or equivalently, increase saving), unless the 
individual exhibited prudence.   
In addition to precautionary saving, prudence was also seen as being analogous to an aversion to 
“increases in downside risk,” as defined by Menezes et al. (1980).  A pure increase in downside 
risk does not change the mean nor the variance of a risky wealth prospect, but it does increase 
the negative skewness.  More generally, prudence plays an important roll in the tradeoff between 
risk and skewness for economic decisions made under uncertainty, as shown by Chiu (2005).  
Yet these prudence effects as described above have been defined almost exclusively within an 
expected-utility (EU) context; and those outside of an EU context have been defined in such a 
way as to mimic properties inherent to the utility function.   
A lesser known trait affecting behavior towards risk is temperance, a term also coined by 
Kimball (1992).
2  Kimball explains how temperance will lead an individual facing an 
                                                 
1  A somewhat stronger version is sometimes used; namely that an individual dislikes any mean-preserving spread of 
his or her wealth distribution.  For expected-utility preferences, these two characterizations coincide.  See 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). 
2  Within an expected utility setting, prudence has been characterized by utility of wealth having a positive third 
derivative and temperance has been characterized a as a negative fourth derivative.  See Gollier and Pratt (1996) and 
  1unavoidable risk to reduce exposure to another [independent] risk.  Although not a perfect 
analog, in the same way that risk aversion is not a perfect analog for aversion to a higher 
variance (Rothschild and Siglitz 1970), a temperate individual generally dislikes kurtosis.  In an 
EU setting, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) show that temperance is both necessary and 
sufficient for an increase in the downside risk of future labor income to always increase the level 
of precautionary saving.   
More recently, both prudence and temperance have been defined outside of an EU context.  In 
particular, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) define both concepts via preferences over 
particular classes of lottery pairs.
3  What makes these characterizations particularly appealing is 
their simplicity, as they are stated in terms of comparing simple 50-50 lottery pairs.  
Whether or not people actually behave in a risk-averse manner has been studied in numerous 
empirical settings as well as in various experiments.  Indeed, experiments have even gone so far 
as to see whether or not risk aversion is a biological trait common to other animals, as in Battalio 
et al. (1985).  Although many studies have attempted to measure the intensity of risk aversion, 
which requires a particular preference structure, others have just noted whether or not risk 
aversion was a predominant trait.  A good overview of both the laboratory experiments and the 
field experiments on risk aversion can be found in Deck et al. (2008) and Post et al. (2008). 
A few papers have looked at empirical support for prudence, although these papers all trace 
prudence via the precautionary demand for saving.  See, for example, Dynan (1993), Carroll 
(1994) and Carroll and Kimball (2008).  We know of no empirical papers that intentionally test 
for temperance, although the results of Guiso et al. (1996) are consistent with temperate 
behavior.
4   
We are not aware of any experimental papers that test for temperance and are aware of only one 
that directly tests for prudence.  Tarazona-Gomez (2004) sets up an experiment to test for the 
strength of the prudence effect.  In doing so, her evidence points to some support for prudence, 
although the strength of the prudence effect is rather weak; very close to what she labels 
“prudence neutrality.”  Rather than directly eliciting comparisons of lotteries in her experiments, 
Tarazona-Gomez elicits certainty equivalents for sets of lotteries and uses them to indirectly 
                                                                                                                                                             
Eeckhoudt et al. (1996).  Kimball (1993) explains why these higher-order effects, and not just risk aversion, are 
important in understanding behavior under risk.  For more on these effects and moments see Roger (2007). 
3  The equivalence of these lottery preferences to prudence within an EU framework had been noted earlier by 
Bigelow and Menezes (1995) and Eeckhoudt et al. (1995).   
4  Guiso et al. (1996) use survey Italian data to examine how pension-wealth risk affects non-pension investment 
portfolio decisions.  They find that riskier perceptions of pension risk lead to less risky investment portfolios. 
  2compare lotteries as well as to determine the strength of any prudence effect.  Her methodology 
is largely based in expected-utility theory. 
In this paper we exploit the simplicity of the Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) lottery-
preference definitions and design an experiment to test for both prudence and for temperance.  
Although we do not attempt to measure the intensity of these two effects, our lottery 
comparisons have the benefit that they are much simpler for subjects to understand.  Moreover, 
our experiment is not based in an expected-utility setting, so that the results can be applied 
within any decision-theoretic framework.   
In addition to being simple 50-50 lottery pairs, each pair of lotteries in our experiment has the 
same expected payoff and the same variance.  Thus, a risk-neutral agent would be indifferent to 
each pair of lotteries.  Moreover, there is no second-order stochastic dominance in our lottery 
choice comparisons, so risk aversion alone cannot explain the choices.  Indeed, each set of 
choices is designed to have a unique ranking if and only if preferences display a higher-order risk 
effect.  Some of the choices involved in our experiment coincide with prudent behavior and 
others with temperate behavior.  The lotteries used to detect prudence differ in their skewness, 
while those used to detect temperance have zero skewness but differ in their kurtosis.   
Our results indicate some support for prudence, but not for temperance; indeed, they support 
intemperance.  Although these results have nothing to say about the validity of EU theory in 
general, they would lead us to reject all of the most commonly used utility functions, including 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).  However, 
our results are consistent with preferences defined via cumulative prospect theory, using 
parameters similar to those suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  
We also test for a “stakes effect,” to see if the size of the payoffs affects the decisions.  There is 
weak support for the hypothesis that prudent behavior is more likely to be exhibited when the 
stakes are higher.  Also, a stakes effect was evidenced for temperance in the sense that, although 
behavior was mostly intemperate, it was less intemperate when the stakes were higher.  Both of 
these stakes effects are inconsistent with EU theory. 
We begin in the next section by introducing the concepts of prudence and temperance as types of 
preferences over particular classes of lottery pairs.  In section 3, we describe the experiment, 
while section 4 presents and interprets the behavioral results.  The concluding two sections stress 
the significance of our findings for economic modeling in both EU and non-EU settings. 
 
  32. Prudence, Temperance and Lottery Preference 
Consider a risk-averse individual with an initial wealth W > 0.  Let k > 0 and let  1 ε %  and  2 ε %  be 
two statistically-independent zero-mean random variables.  Consider the following two lotteries 
expressed via probability trees, as shown in Figure 1.
5  We assume that all branches have a 
probability of occurrence of one-half, and that all variables are defined so as to maintain a 





         Figure 1:  Lottery preference as prudence 
 
In lottery B3, the individual always receives one of the two “harms,” either a sure loss of k or the 
addition of a zero-mean random wealth change  1 ε % .  In lottery A3 the individual has a 50-50 
chance of either receiving both harms together or of receiving neither one.  Eeckhoudt and 
Schlesinger (2006) define an individual as being prudent if she always prefers lottery B3 to 
lottery A3.  They refer to this as a preference for “disaggregating the harms.”  Alternately, one 
could describe the behavior as preferring to attach the zero-mean lottery  1 ε %  to the state with the 
higher wealth vis-à-vis the state with the lower wealth.  Although this definition is not specific to 
EU, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) show that this lottery preference under EU, with 
differentiable utility, is equivalent to a positive third derivative of the utility function.
6   
To define temperance, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) simply replace the “harm” of losing 
the fixed amount of wealth k with the “harm” of the second zero-mean risk  2 ε % .  They define an 
individual as being temperate if she always prefers lottery B4 to lottery A4, where these lotteries 
are as depicted in Figure 2.  Again, this is a preference for “disaggregating the harms.” 
 
                                                 
5  Our notation here matches the descriptions in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), who also extend these concepts 
to arbitrarily high orders.   
6  Unlike under certainty, the signs of all of the higher-order derivatives of the utility function have some economic 
significance in an EU context.  The link between the sign of the third derivative and precautionary saving was 
established by Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970). 
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            Figure 2:  Lottery preference as temperance 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the Universities of Alabama and Arkansas.  The subjects were 
students from the Colleges of Business at these two universities.  In total there were 59 
participants from the University of Alabama and 40 from the University of Arkansas.  The 
objective of the experiment was to determine if participants exhibit behavior consistent with 
prudence and/or temperance.   
Subjects were presented with a series of tasks in which they revealed their preferred combination 
of fixed dollar amounts and zero-mean random variables, consistent with the framework of 
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006).  Each zero-mean random variable was itself a simple lottery 
of the form: gain $x with 50% probability and lose $x with 50% probability.
7 To aid subject 
comprehension, lotteries were presented graphically as divided circles containing the payoff 
amounts.  
Subjects were endowed with an initial amount of money in every task and knew that one of two 
equally likely states would occur.
8  For simplicity, the states are denoted as Heads and Tails, 
since the state was ultimately determined by a coin flip in the experiment.  Prior to the state 
being realized, subjects had to determine in which state they wanted to receive each of the two 
additional items.   
                                                 
7  As explained to the subjects in the directions, lotteries were implemented by a spinner with a face that was half 
green and half red.  If the spinner stopped on green the subject received the positive amount and if the spinner 
stopped on red the subject received the negative amount.      
8 The endowment included a $5.00 participation payment that subjects received for the 30-45 minute experiment.  
Institutional constraints dictated that subjects could not lose this $5.00 payment, but by including it in the task 
endowment it was not possible for a subject to nominally earn $0 in any task.  Therefore, the choices should not 
reflect a $0 payoff avoidance.     
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  5For tasks related to prudence, the two additional items were a lottery and a fixed dollar amount.  
For temperance, the items were two zero-mean lotteries.  The following excerpt shows two of the 
tasks faced by some subjects.    
 
Task #2)      You will receive $10.50 +  
1  ‐1  if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and $9.00 if the coin lands on the Same or 
Different outcome. 
 
Task #3)      You will receive $55.00 +  
 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and 
5   ‐5   if the coin lands on the Same or 
Different outcome. 
In the first task a subject was endowed with $10.50.  A subject had to identify her preference by 
circling the state in which she wanted to receive a lottery that would either add or subtract $1 
from her payoff.  She also indicated if she wanted to receive an additional $9 in the same or 
different state as the lottery.
9  A prudent person would prefer to have the two items in the same 
state.  The answer to the first question is irrelevant, but the instrument is designed to give the 
subject the most flexibility and assurance that the experiment is not rigged.   
The second task examines temperance.  With an endowment of $55, a subject must indicate 
when she wishes to receive a lottery to gain or lose $45 and a lottery to gain or lose $5.  A 
temperate person would want the lotteries in different states, so as to “disaggregate the harms.”   
A total of 6 prudence tasks and 4 temperance tasks were completed by each subject.  Keeping 
with the methodology of experimental economics, subjects were paid based upon their choices 
and thus had salient motivation to truthfully reveal their preferences.  All amounts denote the 
$US payments that a participant would received in cash at the conclusion of the experiment.  
Hence, the stakes in some tasks are an order of magnitude greater than what is typical for 
laboratory experiments.  In the second task shown above, a subject could earn $105.   
 
                                                 
9 Using the labels Same and Different is designed to reinforce to subjects the fact only one state will be realized (i.e.  
there is not a separate coin flip for each item).    
  6Table 1.  Decision Tasks 
Version 
1 Tasks 










1 $30.00  +/-  $25  $25  $42.50  P  10  5  6 
2  $15.00  +/- $5  +/- $5  $15.00  T  9  4  7 
3 $12.50  $9  +/-  $5  $17.00  P 8  3  8 
4  $15.00  +/- $9  +/- $1  $15.00  T  7  2  9 
5 $12.50  +/-  $5  $1  $13.00  P 6  1  10 
6  $55.00  +/- $25  +/- $25 $55.00  T  5  10  1 
7 $10.50  $9  +/-  $1  $15.00  P 4  9  2 
8  $55.00  +/- $5  +/- $45 $55.00  T  3  8  3 
9 $12.50  $5  +/-  $5  $15.00  P 2  7  4 
10 $14.50  +/-  $9  $1  $15.00  P  1  6  5 
Version i Tasks indicate the order in which that task appeared on Version i.  A ~ indicates that the order of the items 
was switched for each task in that version.  +/- $x denotes the lottery in which a subject has a 50% change of gaining 
$x and a 50% chance of losing $x.  Type indicates if the task is related to prudence (P) or temperance (T).   
 
To control for effects from the sequence of the tasks and the ordering of items within a task, four 
versions of the experimental instrument were used.  Table 1 details the 10 tasks that subjects 
completed.
10 The examples discussed above were from Version 4.  A subject’s payoff was 
determined by one task, which was randomly selected by rolling a ten sided die.  This commonly 
employed technique was explained to the subjects before they began the experiment.
11  Prior to 
making their decisions, subjects were invited to inspect the coin, die, and spinner.  The expected 
payoff from participating in the experiment was $25.80. 
Given the exploratory nature of this research, the specific amounts were selected to allow for a 
variety of comparisons.  Tasks 3, 5, and 9 of Version 1 have the same endowment and lottery but 
different fixed amounts.  Tasks 7, 9, and 10 of Version 1 have identical expected values, but the 
relative size of the lottery and fixed payment vary.  The impact of increasing the amount won or 
lost in a lottery can be measured by comparing Tasks 3 and 7 of Version 1 as well as Tasks 5 and 
10 of Version 1.  The lottery and fixed payment of Task 1 in Version 1 are five times those of 
Task 9, which is designed to measure a stakes effect on prudence.  Tasks 2 and 4 in Version 1 are 
designed to determine if relative size of the lotteries impacts temperance.  Tasks 6 and 8 are 
                                                 
10 The task and item order for Version 1 was determined randomly.  The other three versions were created based 
upon Version 1. 
11 Laury (2005) demonstrates that subjects do not discount the payoffs by the probability of the task being selected. 
  7similar to Tasks 2 and 4, but with stakes that are 5 times greater allowing for identification of a 
stakes effect on temperance.   
While the experiment involves only individual decisions, groups of approximately 20 subjects 
completed the pen and paper experiment in the same room at the same time.  As a further control 
for extraneous factors, approximately equal numbers of each instrument version were used in 
each session.  Subjects completed a single version and could not attend multiple sessions.   Once 
the subjects entered the laboratory and completed the informed consent material, they read the 
instructions and answered a series of comprehension questions.  After their responses had been 
checked, subjects were allowed to make their actual decisions for the 10 tasks.  While the order 
in which the tasks were presented was dependent upon the instrument version, subjects were free 
to complete the tasks in any order they wished and were allowed to change their answers.   
Once a subject had completed the 10 tasks and did not wish to change any responses, that subject 
was then allowed to privately roll the die to determine which task would be used for her actual 
payoff.  The subject was also allowed to flip the coin to determine which state was realized.  If 
necessary, the experimenter used the spinner to avoid any temptation on the part of subjects to 
cheat.  The appendix contains the directions, comprehension questions, and Version 1 of the 
experimental instrument.  
Once the initial data were collected, an additional version of the experiment was implemented.
12  
Version 5 had two differences from the versions described above.  First, the additional fixed 
amounts were presented as losses instead of gains.  There is evidence that people view the 
domain of gains and losses differently.  One of the most familiar models of this behavior is 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), which 
holds that people are risk averse over gains and risk loving over losses.  This design change 
affords an exploration of a similar phenomenon in a higher-order setting.  To keep the expected 
value of each task constant across versions, this design change requires that the endowments are 
offset by the same amount.  The second change involved the presentation.  The superfluous 
decision of how to allocate the first item was removed and that item was received by the subject 
if the state was Heads.  Thus, participants needed to make only one decision for each task: would 
                                                 
12 Given that the instrument version did not influence behavior in the initial instrument versions, only one version of 
the new instrument was used.  The order of the new version was the same as Version 1.  The experiment was only 
conducted at Alabama, in a group with 24 business undergraduates who had not completed the experiment 
previously.     
  8the second item be received on the Same or the Different outcome.  For example, Task #2 in 
Version 4, which was shown above, was modified as follows.
13     
 
Task #7) You will receive $19.50 to start.   
In addition, you will lose $9.00 if the coin lands on Heads and receive 
1  ‐1  if the coin 
lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
 
The temperance tasks do not involve fixed amounts and thus do not have an analogous reversal.  
Here, the only change between the new version and the original versions are the changes in 
presentation.  Hence, comparing temperance behavior across the experimental instruments 
provides a measure of the impact that these design changes have on behavior.
14     
 
4. Behavioral Results 
The results are presented separately for the prudence and the temperance tasks.  Note that the 
mean payoff is the same for each lottery within a lottery pair.  Thus, a risk-neutral agent would 
be indifferent between the lotteries.  Moreover, the variances of each lottery pair are also the 
same.  Higher moments of the payoff distributions, however, are not the same.  Given that 
prudence is examined over gains and losses with differing instruments, the analysis first 
considers temperance.   
Temperance 
In each of the temperance tasks, not only the mean and the variance, but also the skewness of the 
final payoff is independent of the choice made by the subject.  Indeed, it easy to show that the 
less preferred temperate choice (i.e., a lottery of the form A4 in section 2) has a more leptokurtic 
distribution.  The higher kurtosis essentially tells us that, although the variances are the same, 
more of the variance in the A4 lotteries are due to lower probability extreme events, also called 
“tail events.”  In other words, the probability distributions of the A4 type lotteries have “fatter 
tails.”  The temperate individual always dislikes these fatter tails. 
                                                 
13 There were also slight modifications to the wording, which can be seen by comparing task #7 of Version 5 here to 
the previous wording we reported in task #2. 

































Figure 3.  Distribution of the Number of Temperate Choices by Subjects  
 
The subjects in our experiment showed no evidence of temperance, as only 38% of total 
responses assigned the two lotteries to the same state.  In fact, the opposite behavior 
(“intemperance”) appears to be occurring.  Figure 3 shows the frequency of subjects making 
temperate choices.  Overall, only 6% of the subjects acted temperately on all four tasks by 
always opting to have the lotteries separated.  By comparison 50% of the subjects combined the 
lotteries on at least 3 of the 4 tasks.  Formally, we reject the null hypothesis that subjects were 
selecting choices randomly in favor of the one sided alternative that subjects exhibited 
intemperance (Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic = 0.1926).   This is based upon a comparison of the 
distribution of temperate choices with that which would occur if subjects behaved randomly.   








1 - 4 
Percent 
Temperate 
in Version 5 
p-value 
2  $15.00  +/- $5  +/- $5  44%  25%  0.0973 
4  $15.00  +/- $9  +/- $1  36%  13%  0.0292 
6  $55.00  +/- $25  +/- $25  39%  29%  0.3997 
8  $55.00  +/- $5  +/- $45  47%  46%  0.9432 
The last column reports the p-value associated testing the null hypothesis of no difference in the two 
proportions against the two sided alternative.     
 
  10There was no statistical difference between testing locations for the temperance responses.   
Hence, the data are combined in the subsequent discussion.  Table 2 shows the percentage of 
subjects who exhibited temperance on each task.  In no case did a majority of the subjects exhibit 
temperance.  Nominally, there was less temperance observed in version 5 for all four tasks.  This 
difference was significant at the 5% level for one of the four tasks.  This suggests that changing 
the instrument did have some impact on the choices that subjects made.  However, the ultimate 
conclusion remains the same.  There is little evidence to support the claim that subjects are 
temperate.   
There is some modest evidence of a stakes effect.  In Versions 1-4, only 21% of the subjects 
made fewer temperate choices with the higher stakes tasks than the lower stakes.  In Version 5, 
that number falls to just 14%.  However, for approximately half of the subjects, their behavior 
did not change with the stakes.
15  A comparison of tasks 2 and 6 with tasks 4 and 8, in Version 1 
suggests that the relative size of the two zero-mean gambles with respect to each other (Item 1 
vs. Item 2 in Table 2) does not influence behavior. 
Subjects could not leave the experiment with less money than they had when they arrived at the 
experiment.  In addition, they also were presented first with a fixed amount that they would 
receive ex ante of their decisions.  Therefore, subjects might view themselves as playing with the 
house’s money, which may tend to encourage risk seeking to some extent.  See, for example, 
Thaler and Johnson (1990).  As such, it could be that some of the participants were trying to give 
themselves a chance at the highest payoff, since there was “nothing to lose.”  The fact that 50% 
of our subjects paired the lotteries together on 3 out of the 4 temperance tasks indicates they 
might indeed be strategizing in such as way as to maximize the highest potential payoff.  These 
individuals would prefer the “fat tails” in the distribution: willing to trade off potentially very 
bad outcomes for potentially very good ones.   
Prudence 
There is evidence of prudence, although the degree is not overwhelming.  Figure 4 plots the 
frequency of prudent behavior.  Overall, 61% of the subject responses assigned the lottery to the 
state with the higher certain payoff.
16  Very few subjects were never prudent, just 2%, but only 
14% were prudent on all six tasks.  The number of prudent decisions is greater than would be 
                                                 
15 One could argue that for subjects who are prudent in both stake levels the stakes were already sufficiently high in 
the low stakes case.  Similarly, one could argue that the stakes remain too low for those who are not prudent at either 
stakes level.  Thus, the people who do not respond to a change in the stakes are not necessarily inconsistent with a 
stakes effect.     
16  This percentage of is similar to that in the experiments by Tarazona-Gomez, who finds 63% of her subjects (not 
choices on particular tasks, but subjects) to be prudent in a somewhat more complicated experiment. 


































Figure 4.  Distribution of the Number of Prudent Choices by Subjects 
In five of the six tasks, there was no statistically significant difference between testing locations 
for Versions 1-4 and, thus, the data are combined for those tasks.  Table 3 shows the percentage 
of subjects acting prudently.  Prudence does not appear to be impacted by framing the certain 
state as a loss rather than a gain; in two of the four tasks more prudence is observed with a 
negative frame.  However, as was the case with temperance, we cannot rule out a behavioral 
effect from playing with the house’s money and seeking out the highest potential gain.  Such a 
strategy would lead to the prudent choice of putting the zero-mean gamble together with the 
higher fixed-wealth outcome. 
Based on a comparison of tasks 1 and 9 in Version 1, there is again some evidence of a stakes 
effect.  More prudent behavior is observed when the items are a +/- $25 lottery and a $25 gain 
(loss) for sure than when the items are a +/- $5 and a $5 gain (loss).  Approximately one third of 
the subjects changed their behavior when the stakes increased.  Of these, almost 70% made more 
prudent choices with the higher stakes.  There is no change in behavior due to increasing the size 
of the fixed amount while holding the lottery and the endowment constant; a comparison of 
Tasks 3, 5, and 9 in Version 1.  Similarly, varying the relative size of the lottery and the fixed 
amount holding the expected value of the task fixed does not change behavior; a comparison of 
Tasks 7, 9, and 10 in Version 1.  Finally, changing the stakes in the lottery for the same fixed 
amount does not change behavior, based upon comparisons of Tasks 3 and 7, as well as Tasks 5 
and 10, in Version 1 
 
  12Table 3.  Prudent Behavior 
Version 
1 Task 
Endowment  Item 1  Item 2 
Percent 
Prudent in 





1 $30.00  +/-  $25  $25 71%  63%  0.4527 
3 $12.50  $9  +/-  $5  59%  79%  0.0692 
5 $12.50  +/-  $5  $1  61%  54%  0.5334 
7 $10.50  $9  +/-  $1  57%  58%  0.9312 
9 $12.50  $5  +/-  $5  60%  42%  0.1157 
10  $14.50  +/- $9  $1  83% : 57%  42%  0.2428
x 
In task #10, 83% made the prudent choice at Arkansas but only 57% at Alabama.  The p-value associated with 
the null hypothesis that the percentage was the same in the two locations against the two sided alternative was 
0.02. Thus the percentages are reported separately for the two locations. The last column reports the p-value 
associated with testing the null hypothesis of no difference in the two proportions against the two sided 
alternative.  
x indicates that this p-value is based upon a comparison of Version 5 with the data from Versions 
1-4 at the same location (Alabama), since there was a significant difference between the two locations for the 
original versions.  
 
There is some evidence that the number of prudent choices and the number of temperate choices 
made by a subject are not independent.  Figure 5 shows the percentage of subjects for each 
combination of prudent and temperate choices.  The correlation between the number of 
temperate and prudent choices is -0.06, however, this correlation is not statistically significantly 
different from zero.
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Figure 5.  Number of Prudent and Temperate Choices by Subjects 
                                                 
17  For independence, the chi-square statistic is 34.05 with 24 degrees of freedom (p-value = 0.0837).  The 
insignificance of the correlation coefficient is based upon a t-test (t-value = -0.64 with 97 degrees of freedom). 
  135. Implications for Preferences 
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) make no claim that preferences should be either prudent or 
temperate in a normative or in a positive sense.  They only define these behaviors and show their 
equivalences within an EU framework.  So what does it imply when we support prudence but 
also support intemperance?  For one, there is no reason a priori to expect that preferences need 
be always prudent or always imprudent.  It is certainly within reason that preferences display 
prudence in some cases and imprudence in others.  In other words, marginal utility might be 
locally convex for some wealth levels and locally concave for others.  Analogous arguments 
apply for temperance.
18   
Our results also do not directly add to any list of arguments in support of EU or against EU as a 
choice-theoretic framework.  However, taken at their face value, the results would rule out all of 
the commonly-used classes of utility functions.  For example both constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) imply that preferences are temperate.  In 
addition, one would need to rule out quadratic utility as well, since such preferences are well-
known to depend only on the first two moments of the wealth distributions.  Lesser known utility 
classes, such as the “strong one-switch utility” functions of Bell and Fishburn (2001) likewise 
need to be ruled out as they also always exhibit temperance.
19   
One model that could be consistent with prudence as well as with intemperance is the cumulative 
prospect theory model (CPT) of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  Since expected wealth is the 
same for both lottery choices, we might canonically view the so-called reference point as the 
expected level of wealth.  Since the valuation function in their model is S-shaped, it would tend 
to devalue both high gains as well as high losses.  However, the weighting function that is 
applied to the cumulative probabilities has an inverted S-shape, which would effectively increase 
the weight in both tails. 
Consider first temperance and consider only the S-shaped valuation function, with a kink at the 
reference point to induce loss aversion.  An outcome distribution with a higher kurtosis would 
typically do two things: increase the size of the tails and reduce the spread of probability mass 
that is closer to the mean (i.e. closer to the reference point).  Given loss aversion, this “bunching” 
of probability mass near the mean would be welfare increasing.  In addition, the S-shape implies 
that the fatter tails are not too bothersome.  If we now consider the probability weighting, we 
have the opposite effect: this weighting tends to increase the importance of the fat tails.  Whether 
                                                 
18  We note, however, that if utility exhibits risk aversion and prudence at all wealth levels, that it is not possible for 
preferences to exhibit intemperance at every wealth level.  See, for example, Menegatti (2001). 
19  These utility functions are the sum of a linear plus an exponential function of wealth.   
  14or not preference exhibit temperance or not is thus dependent upon the parameters of the 
decision problem, as well as on the parameters of the CPT value function and the weighting 
function. 
For prudence, we again obtain an ambiguous answer to the question as to whether CPT exhibits 
prudence or not.  The S-shaped valuation function by itself would imply that a zero-mean risk is 
preferred at the lower wealth (in the domain of “losses”), since the valuation function is convex 
at these wealth levels.  Hence preferences would be imprudent.  However, the distortion of the 
probability to increase the weight in the tails of the distribution implies that these fair zero-mean 
gambles do not seem fair after the probability distortions.  In particular: (i) an objectively fair bet 
in the domain of gains overweights the upside, making the bet seem favorable and (ii) the same 
objectively fair bet in the domain of losses overweights the downside, making the bet seem 
unfavorable.  Once again the probability weighting works in the opposite direction of the 
valuation function.  Hence, both prudence and imprudence can be theoretically consistent with 
CPT.
20   
Using parameters similar to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we find that all six of our prudence 
tasks would show a preference for prudence under CPT.  In a similar manner, we find that all 
four of the temperance tasks would show a preference for intemperance under CPT.
21  
Obviously, these results could change with different lottery and wealth specifications.  They 
could also change with different CPT parameters.  Our point here is that it is at least possible to 
come up with preference models displaying both prudence and intemperance.   
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In addition to risk aversion, higher orders of risk-preference behavior are important in analyzing 
behavior under uncertainty.  For example, the link between prudence (a third-order effect) and 
precautionary saving is well known.  Although less known, temperance (a fourth-order effect) 
also plays a key role in the analysis of behavior.  Moreover, these effects often equate to a 
                                                 
20  We are aware of one paper, Ågren (2006), that examines both of these effects, but the results are restricted to 
inverse Gaussian distributions.  Ågren uses parameters taken from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and shows that 
CPT preferences are prudent.  However, his results for kurtosis are mixed, with the decision maker liking both very 
high and very low levels of kurtosis. 
21  In particular, we used the weighting function  , where F denotes the 
cumulative probability.  We used the valuation function   for x > r, and   for 
, where r denotes the reference point, i.e. the mean wealth in our lotteries.   
) 65 . / 1 ( 65 . 65 . 65 . ] ) 1 ( [ ) (
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  15preference for more positive skewness and against a higher kurtosis, when we restrict the 
distribution functions being compared. 
In this paper, we report the results of an experiment that directly tested for prudence and for 
temperance.  Although we find support for prudence, it is not overwhelming.  We find no 
support for temperance.  Indeed, to the contrary, preferences seem to be intemperate.  
To what extent this behavior was the result of other psychological factors, such as playing with 
house money, is not apparent.  Most economic research on decision making under uncertainty 
does not distinguish between the sources of outcomes.  We do find mild evidence of a stakes 
effect for both prudence and for temperance.  Of course, even though the relative sizes of the 
stakes in our experiment varied quite a lot, the highest dollar amounts are still not likely to have 
a lasting impact on most of the subjects and thus one would not expect a dramatic wealth 
effect.
22 However, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) require that prudent and temperate people 
hold the specified preference relation no matter how trivial the stakes.   
We have no other benchmark results, to which we can compare our data for temperance.  For 
prudence, our numbers seem to support the findings of Tarazona-Gomez, who measures the 
strength of the prudence effect within an EU-based setting and finds that her subjects were 
mostly prudent, but not very much so.  Our results also support the empirical conclusions of 
Dynan (1993), who finds evidence of very weak prudence, using an EU-based methodology.   
We think our results have implications that are much broader than many people initially realize.  
For example, in an EU-framework, both CARA utility and CRRA utility are used with great 
frequency.  Each of these utility forms always displays both prudence and temperance.  But, to 
the extent that our results are not due to other behavioral effects, they would reject these classes 
of utility, since we find preferences to be somewhat intemperate.  Likewise, the sometimes-used 
quadratic form of utility has both zero prudence and zero temperance, neither of which is 
supported by our experiment.   
Similarly, non-expected utility theories should be cognizant of these higher-order risk effects.  
The literature has developed alternative concepts for risk aversion, such as ambiguity aversion, 
see Schmeidler (1989), and loss aversion, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  However, we are 
not aware of any efforts to extend these higher-order risk affects.   
                                                 
22  This is generally true for laboratory experiments studying risk aversion.  See, for example, Deck et al. (2008) and 
Post et al. (2008).  As an extreme stakes effect, one can note the Mega Millions lottery jackpot of March 6, 2007, 
which was $390 million, was split equally between two winners.  Given that the net payout on a lottery ticket is 
usually around 50 cents on the dollar, we might conclude these two winners were risk lovers.  Yet we doubt that 
either one of these two winners would have tossed a coin on the fair bet: “winner takes all.” 
  16Although we showed that our ten tasks would lead to the prudent choices or intemperate choices 
under CPT with parameters similar to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), not all individuals would 
be expected to have the exact same preferences.  Indeed, these parameters for CPT are calibrated 
to fit the average data in Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  In addition to varying the CPT 
parameters, there also are many variations in the functional forms used for both the value 
function and the weighting function.  Most of these are analyzed in Stott (2006).  Moreover, 
Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) have recently come up with alternative ways to incorporate the 
reference point into these types of models.
23 
Of course, there has not been much done in the way of experimentation for these higher-order 
risk affects.  As such, we cannot compare the results of our experiment with others.  What would 
happen with different subjects in the laboratory; or what would happen if our lotteries were 
embedded into field experiments?  Perhaps more temperate behavior would show up in a 
different type of experiment. 
Given their importance in predicting certain types of behavior, there is a need for future 
behavioral research to provide more insight into these higher-order risk effects.  To the extent 
that such endeavors have findings similar to ours, it would call for newer theoretical work to help 
explain the resulting behavior and generate new testable hypotheses. 
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Experiment on Decision Making under Uncertainty:  Higher-Order Effects 
Instructions 
You are participating in a research study on decision making under uncertainty.  At the end of 
the study you will be paid your earnings in cash and it is important that you understand how your 
decisions affect your payoff.  If you have questions at any point, please let a researcher know and 
someone will assist you.  Otherwise, please do not talk during this study and please turn off all 
cell phones. 
On the following sheets there is a series of 10 tasks. Once you have completed these sheets, one 
of the ten tasks will be randomly selected by rolling a 10 sided die to determine your payoff.  
Each task starts with a fixed amount of cash that includes the $5.00 participation payment that 
you are receiving and involves two additional items.  The additional items will be cash or 
lotteries and a coin toss will determine if you receive these items.  A lottery has 50% chance of 
having an amount of money added to your payoff and a 50% chance of that amount of money 
being subtracted from your payoff.   
5   ‐5 
 represents the lottery in which you could have US$ 5.00 added to or subtracted from your 
payoff.  How much money you would receive from the lottery will be determined by a spinner 
that is half green and half red.  If the spinner stops on green, the amount will be added to your 
payoff, but if it lands on red, the amount will be subtracted from your payoff.  You are welcome 
to inspect the coin, die and spinner at any time.   
In each task you determine if you prefer to receive the first additional item when the coin toss 
lands on Heads or Tails.  You will also determine if you prefer to receive the second item on the 
Same or Different outcome of the coin toss as the first item.  There is only one coin toss and you 
are deciding if you want the two items combined (so that you receive both or neither) or if you 
want the two items separated (so that you receive one or the other).  If you receive two lotteries, 
there will be independent spins for each.      
Your choice will not affect the expected value of the task, which is the average amount that you 
would be paid from going through the task many, many times.  Please note that you cannot lose 
your own money or the $5.00 participation payment that you are receiving for completing this 
study.    
 
PLEASE DO NOT CONTINUE UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO! 
   This page contains practice problems that will not impact your payoff in any way.  
Practice # 1)  You will receive $20 +        
 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and $5.00 if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
Suppose you made the indicated responses.    
If your coin toss landed on Heads, your payoff would be ________. 
If your coin toss landed on Tails and the spinner landed on Green, your payoff would be ________. 
If your coin toss landed on Tails and the spinner landed on Red, your payoff would be _________. 
 
Practice # 2)  You will receive $20 + 
 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and $5.00 if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
Suppose you made the indicated responses.    
If your coin toss landed on Heads, your payoff would be _________. 
If your coin toss landed on Tails and the spinner landed on Green, your payoff would be _________. 
If your coin toss landed on Tails and the spinner landed on Red, your payoff would be _________. 
 
Practice # 3)  You will receive $15 + 
 
5   ‐5 
if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and $5.00 if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
Suppose you made the indicated responses.   
If your coin toss landed on Heads and the spinner landed on Green your payoff would be _________. 
If your coin toss landed on Heads and the spinner landed on Red your payoff would be _________. 
If your coin toss landed on Tails, your payoff would be _________. 
  
Practice #4)  You will receive $15 + 
 
5   ‐5 
if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and  if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
Suppose you made the indicated responses.   
If your coin toss landed on Heads and the spinner landed on Green your payoff would be _________. 
If your coin toss landed on Heads and the spinner landed on Red your payoff would be _________. 
If your coin toss landed on Tails and the spinner landed on Green your payoff would be __________. 
If your coin toss landed on Tails and the spinner landed on Red your payoff would be __________. 
 
Once you have completed this sheet, please raise your hand so that an experimenter can check 
your responses and answer any questions you might have.   
PLEASE DO NOT CONTINUE UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO! 
   These pages contain the 10 decision tasks.  One task will be randomly selected to determine your 
payoff.    
 
Task #1)   You will receive $30.00 +  
 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and $25.00 if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
 
Task #2)       You will receive $15 +  
5   ‐5 
if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and 
5   ‐5 
if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
 
Task #3)   You will receive $12.50 +  
$9.00 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and 
5   ‐5 
if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
 
Task # 4)    You will receive $15 +  
9  ‐9
if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and 
1  ‐1
 if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome.  
 
Task #5)    You will receive $12.50 +  
5   ‐5 
 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and $1.00 if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
 
Task #6)      You will receive $55.00 +  
 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and   if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
 
Task #7)      You will receive $10.50 +  
$9.00 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and 
1  ‐1
 if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
   Task #8)      You will receive $55.00 +  
5   ‐5 
 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and   if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
 
Task #9)    You will receive $12.50 + 
$5.00 if the coin lands on Heads or Tails and 
5   ‐5 
 if the coin lands on the Same or Different outcome. 
 
Task #10)      You will receive $14.50 +  
9  ‐9






Please review your answers to verify that everything is marked the way you want it to be.  Please 
raise your hand when you are done and an experimenter will approach you so that your payoff 
may be determined.  Once you have rolled the die to determine which round will be used in 
calculating your payoff, you may not change your responses.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
The remainder of this sheet is to be completed by an experimenter. 
Number Rolled  ________ 
Result of Coin Toss _______ 
Result of Spinner (as necessary) ____________ 
Payoff ____________ 
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